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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ELECTRONIC
EAVESDROPPING
I. ITRODUCTION
The right to privacy, or the right to be let alone, has been
jealously guarded as the most fundamental of individual rights
since the formulation of the Bill of Rights.' It is said to be at
the very core of the fourth amendment 2 and found within the
penumbra of the first, third, fourth, fifth, sixth and ninth
amendments8 Electronic eavesdropping poses a serious threat
to individual privacy. It has challenged the Constitution to
provide adequate safeguards for protecting the precious right to
privacy.
The use of informers "rigged for sound" is not discussed in
this note. On this subject the United States Supreme Court
recently held that the use of informers is not per se unconsti-
tutional,4 and the fact that an informer has hidden on his person
a recorder 5 or a transmitter6 has not been considered to involve
the more serious considerations of privacy that are involved in
secret electronic eavesdropping.
II. ExIsTiNG LAw GovERnuxG EIECToNIC EAVESDROPPING
A. Eavesdropping Without Authorization: The Fourth Amend-
ment Standard
Through the years, the fourth amendment has protected in-
dividual privacy against arbitrary police invasion by prohibiting
searches and seizures made pursuant to an unauthorized entry
1. See Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 477, 480 (1965).
[The Founding Fathers] sought to protect Americans in their beliefs,
their thoughts, their emotions, and their sensations. They conferred, as
against the Government, the right to be let alone-the most compre-
hensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized man. To protect
that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon the
privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed
a violation of the Fourth Amendment. And the use, as evidence in a
criminal proceeding, of facts ascertained by such intrusion must be
deemed a violation of the Fifth. (Emphasis added.)
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (dissenting opinion);
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 622 (1885).
2. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 622 (1885).
3. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 480-507 (1965).
4. Hoffa v. United States, 87 Sup. Ct. 408, 418 (1966).
5. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963).
6. On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
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or trespass.7 With the advent of electronic eavesdropping, how-
ever, came a means of invading privacy without requiring a
physical invasion, thereby circumventing the traditional fourth
amendment "trespass" standard."
The Supreme Court has, nevertheless, considered electronic
eavesdropping within the purview of the fourth amendment,
finding it unconstitutional when it results in an "unauthorized
intrusion into a constitutionally protected area."9 Where a listen-
ing device is held against an adjoining wall to overhear and
record conversations in the next room, there is no "unauthorized
intrusion," and therefore such eavesdropping is constitutional.' 0
On the other hand, if the listening device pierces the adjoining
wall a fraction of an inch, there is an "unauthorized intrusion,"
and the eavesdropping is unconstitutional.' The invasion of
privacy in both cases is the same, the only distinction being the
superficial physical penetration.
The inadequacy of the "trespass" standard in determining the
constitutionality of electronic eavesdropping seems obvious, but
this standard represents the existing law governing electronic
eavesdropping. The inadequacies of the fourth amendment stand-
ard and a suggested constitutional standard which would offer
more adequate protection against the use of electronic eavesdrop-
ping are discussed in section III of this note.
7. Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 477, 480 (1965).
8. Laser beams and extra-sensitive directional microphones enable the mod-
ern eavesdropper secretly to overhear and record conversations within a private
room while stationed some distance away. More examples of advanced elec-
tronic eavesdropping equipment are set out in section III of this Note, infra.
See Time, Dec. 16, 1966, p. 76; "Someone Knows All About You", Esquire,
May, 1966, pp. 98-101; Hearings Before the Sub-Committee on Administrative
Practice and Procedure of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 89th Cong., 1st
Sess., S. Res. 39, at 28, 29, 45-55, 321-325 (1965); PAcKARD, THE NAKED
Socinry 37-38 (1964); DASH, THE EAVESDROPPERS 350, 353, 357-358 (1959).
9. Silverman v. United States, 379 U.S. 477, 480 (1965) Annot., 97
A.L.R.2d 1283 (1964). Compare Clinton v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 158 (1964)
(a penetration in an adjoining wall the depth of a thumbtack was considered
a trespass and thus in violation of the fourth amendment) with Goldman v.
United States, 316 U.S. 129, 134-135 (1940) (placing a detectaphone against
an adjoining wall was not a trespass and thus did not violate the fourth
amendment) ; Katz v. United States, 369 F.2d 130 (9th Cir. 1966) (a micro-
phone attached to the outside of a phone booth was not a violation of the fourth
amendment). For a discussion of what areas are constitutionally protected, see
Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139 (1962) ; See also, United States v. Baxter,
89 F. Supp. 732 (E.D. Tenn. 1952).
10. Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 134-135 (1940); Katz v.
United States, 369 F.2d 130 (9th Cir. 1966).
11. Clinton v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 158 (1964). Accord, Silverman v. United
States, 365 U.S. 505, 510 (1961).
[Vol. 18
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B. Court-Authorized Electronic Eavesdropping
1. As a Violation of the Fourth Amendment. In an attempt
to control electronic eavesdropping some states have enacted
statutes which allow police limited use of electronic eavesdrop-
ping equipment where such use is authorized by court order.12
The court order must have the effect of a search warrant if it is
to legalize an electronic "search and seizure." a3
It is doubtful, however, that a court order authorizing elec-
tronic eavesdropping can comply with the "warrant clause" 14 of
the fourth amendment. The provision of the warrant clause
which seems to defy compliance is the requirement that a search
warrant must particularly describe "the things to be seized." A
specific description of conversation to be "seized" in the future
is impossible since the words have not yet come into existence.
To further complicate matters, electronic eavesdropping is neces-
sarily indiscriminate. No listening device has yet been discovered
which shuts itself off to social discourse and turns itself on
when the conversation turns to crime.15 Due to the nature of
electronic eavesdropping, it seems apparent that a court order
cannot meet the particularization requirement of the warrant
clause, and therefore cannot have the effect of a valid search
warrant. And, if the court order is not equivalent to a search
warrant, it cannot authorize a search and seizure.16
Even if the court order were construed to be a valid warrant,
the prohibition against seizing mere evidence and the notice re-
quirement would seem to render court-ordered electronic eaves-
dropping an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the
fourth amendment.
12. Massachusetts, Maryland, Nevada, New York, and Oregon are among
those states which allow court-ordered electronic eavesdropping.
13. See People v. Grossman, 257 N.Y.S. 2d 266, 275-286 (Sup. Ct. 1965);
66 CoLum. L. Rv. 355 (1965).
14. "[No] warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
person or things to be seized." U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
15. The unpleasant fact is that the snooper, even when he operates under
the most carefully drawn court orders for the most virtuous public pur-
pose, cannot screen out any of the conversation-relevant or irrelevant-
that the insatiable ear of his monitoring devise picks up. In that sense,
once the right to "bug" is granted, no practical limit may be put on its
exercise.
N.Y. Times, Nov. 28, 1966, § L, p. 38.
16. Where a search warrant fails to particularize the "things to be seized"
it is a general warrant, and a search pursuant to such a warrant is a general
search in violation of the fourth amendment. Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S.
477, 481 (1965).
1966]
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In determining the reasonableness of a search and seizure, the
Supreme Court has often condemned the seizure of mere evidence
as a violation of the fourth amendment, 17 emphasizing the dis-
tinction between merely evidentiary materials, which may not
be seized under the authority of a search warrant or incident to a
lawful arrest, and those items which may be validly seized.' 8 The
only things that may be the subject of a lawful seizure are fruits
of the crime,19 contraband,20 and instruments of the crime.2"
The basis for this distinction is found in the landmark case of
Entick v. Ca~rngto072 2 which stated that "the law obligeth no
man to accuse himself... and a search for mere evidence is dis-
allowed on the same principle. 2 3 A search warrant cannot re-
move the barrier set up to protect the right of privacy and private
ownership. This barrier can be removed only to permit the re-
capture of illegally obtained property or to permit the seizure
of property which has been forfeited because it was used as an
instrument of crime. The prohibition against the seizure of
"mere evidence" is so fundamental that it is applied to the states
through the fourteenth amendment.
24
It follows that a court order cannot authorize a search for
"mere evidence" since such a search is unreasonable and in viola-
tion of the fourth amendment.25 It is difficult to conceive of
conversations which could be classified as fruits of a crime, con-
traband, or instruments of a crime, so that most, if not all, con-
versations fall in the category of "mere evidence." If conversa-
tions are no more than "mere evidence," to overhear and record
them would constitute an unreasonable search and seizure in
violation of the fourth amendment, even where a court order
purports to authorize such eavesdropping.26
Traditionally, notice has been a requirement of reasonable
searches and seizures.27 It is obvious that expediency requires
17. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 154 (1947); United States v.
Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1931) ; Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
18. Ibid.
19. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 622 (1885).
20. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 155 (1947).
21. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 238 (1960).
22. 19 HOWELL, STATE TRIALS 1029 (1765).
23. Id. at 1073.
24. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 110 (1964).
25. Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 477, 480 (1965).
26. See People v. Grossman, 257 N.Y.S. 2d 266, 278-284 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
27. Our American common lav recognizes the requirement of notice. See
McCaslin v. McCord, 116 Tenn. 690, 708, 94 S.W. 79, 83 (1906); Barnard
V l. 18
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that no notice be given to parties whose conversations are to be
secretly overheard and recorded. Police inconvenience, however,
is not justification for disregarding constitutional requirements,
so that lack of notice might well determine court-ordered elec-
tronic eavesdropping to be an unreasonable search and seizure, in
violation of the fourth amendment.
28
Court-authorized electronic eavesdropping seems inherently
violative of the fourth amendment. The requirement to par-
ticularize "the things to be seized," the prohibition against seiz-
ing "mere evidence" of crime, and the requirement of notice all
operate as constitutional barriers to court-authorized electronic
eavesdropping. And with no authorization, eavesdropping accom-
plished by an intrusion into a constitutionally protected area is
clearly a violation of the fourth amendment.29 If the consti-
tutionality of electronic eavesdropping is to be determined by the
existing standards of the fourth amendment, electronic eaves-
dropping seems inherently unconstitutional."9
2. As a Violation of the Fifth Amendment. If court-authorized
electronic eavesdropping is found to violate the fourth amend-
ment, then it violates the fifth amendment as well. The Su-
preme Court has traditionally recognized the intimate relation-
ship between the fourth amendment prohibition against un-
reasonable searches and seizures and the privilege against self-
incrimination of the fifth amendment.3 1 Thus the fifth amend-
ment becomes another constitutional obstacle to court-authorized
electronic eavesdropping.
v. Bartlett, 64 Mass. 501, 502 (1852); State v. Smith, 1 N.H. 346 (1818).
The protections of indivdiual freedom incorporated into the fourth amend-
ment include the firmly established common law requirement that police
announce their presence before entering pursuant to a search warrant. Boyd
v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1885). There are exceptions to the notice
requirement. See generally Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963) (notice
not required where suspect could have easily destroyed unlawful drugs);
Read v. Case, 4 Conn. 166 (1822) (notice not required where the police
are in peril of bodily injury).
28. See generally Hoese, "Electronic Eavesdropping," 52 CALrF. L. Rtv. 142,
153 (1964).
29. Clinton v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 158 (1964); Silverman v. United States,
379 U.S. 477, 480 (1961).
30. It has been suggested that the fourth amendment will allow police
restricted use of electronic eavesdropping, but it is conceded that new standards
must be formulated to apply the fourth amendment to electronic eaves-
dropping. See 50 MINN. L. REv. 378, 408 (1966).
31. Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965); Boyd v. United States,
116 U.S. 616, 633 (1885). The unreasonable searches and seizures condemned
in the fourth amendment are almost always made for the purpose of com-
pelling a man to give evidence against himself, which in a criminal case is
condemned in the fifth amendment. 379 U.S. 476, 485.
19661 NoTs
5
Barnes: The Constitutionality of Electronic Eavesdropping
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
So=Tn' CAnOLINA LAW REVEW
3. As a Violation of the First Amendment. Court order stat-
utes may be held unconstitutional on their face as prior restraints
on the freedom of speech. It is well established that any statute
operating as a prior restraint on the freedom of expression, as-
sembly or press is unconstitutional.3 2
The Supreme Court has recognized the vital relationship be-
tween privacy and the "preferred rights" of the first amend-
ment. Where there is no privacy, there can be no freedom of ex-
pression.83 Mr. Justice Brennan recognized that the freedom of
expression is undermined when people fear to speak uncon-
strainedly in what they suppose to be the privacy of their home
or office.34 Knowledge that police are allowed by statute to
utilize electronic eavesdropping equipment to secretly invade the
privacy of constitutionally protected areas most certainly pro-
motes apprehension in the minds of the public. This public ap-
prehension operates as a prior restraint on the freedom of
expression since no one can be certain that his conversations are
not being secretly overheard and recorded by the police.
We need not speculate as to the effect of authorized electronic
eavesdropping on the freedom of speech. Over two decades ago
in Nazi Germany members of families were forced to gather in
bathrooms to conduct whispered discussions of intimate affairs
if they were to escape the omnipresent ear of the secret police.35
The title of Vance Packard's The Naked Society0 indicates the
effect that electronic eavesdropping devices have on a free so-
ciety. George Orwell goes even further in his novel, 1984,s3 in
which he paints a picture of an entire race being subverted to a
ruthless god-head, Big Brother, by means of advanced electronic
eavesdropping equipment. Senator Edward V. Long (D. Mis-
souri) chided public apathy toward electronic eavesdropping
and warned:
Privacy is necessary to the development of a free and
independent people. To preserve this privacy, our national
lethargy and lack of knowledge must be countered. Unless
32. Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 561 (1948); Near v. Minnesota, 283
U.S. 694, 723 (1931).
33. Griswold v. Connecticutt, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965); NAACP v. Ala-
bama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958).
34. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 470 (1963) (dissenting opinion).
35. United States v. On Lee, 193 F. 2d 306, 317 (2d Cir. 1952) (dissenting
opinion).
36. See PACKARD, THE NAKED SOCIETY (1964).
37. See ORWELL, 1984 (1949).
[Vol. 18
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we preserve our right to privacy, we will be threatened with
a long downhill slide into a state of conformity and de-
pendence upon Big Brother. Encroachments on freedom
begin on a small, insidious scale. Let us take heed now.""
In summary, court order statutes and the electronic eaves-
dropping they authorize are in violation of the first, fourth, and
fifth amendments. It is difficult to imagine any police activity
more fraught with constitutional violations than electronic eaves-
dropping, and court authorization does not affect its inherent
unconstitutionality.3
9
III. ELEomoic EAVESDROPPING AND Ti RIGHT TO PRIVAoY
A. The Inadequacy of the Fourth Amendment Standard
Modern technology has provided police with devices which may
overhear and record conversations occurring within the most
private confines without necessitating a physical entry. A radar
microphone disguised as an auto spotlight can monitor a conver-
sation taking place in a closed office blocks away by picking up
the vibrations on a window pane. Long-range "mikes" mounted
on tripods and aimed like guns are available. Parabolic micro-
phones may be utilized to amplify millions of times those sound
waves produced in a distant conversation. Portable laser "Mikes"
emit an invisible infrared beam no larger than a pencil which may
enter the home or office through a closed window. The beam is
then reflected back and the conversation decoded. These repre-
sent only a few of the devices now available to the police. 40
38. See Long, "You Ought to Be Let Alone," Esquire, May, 1966, p. 103.
39. The one thing that emerges with any clarity from the flak currently
enveloping Robert F. Kennedy and J. Edgar Hoover is the apparent
impossibility of putting effective restraints on invasions of privacy by
electronic snoopers.
The Kennedy-Hoover exchange merely underscores the difficulties
involved in trying to establish practical limits on eavesdropping, even
when performed solely by law-enforcement agencies in the interest of
national security or crime control. The minimum requirement before any
tap is established ought to be an order signed by a judge, but it becomes
increasingly evident that watching the watchdogs can be as vexing a
problem as what they watch.
N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1966, § L, p. 46.
40. See Time, Dec. 16, 1966, p. 76; "Someone Knows All About You",
Esquire, May, 1966, pp. 98-101; Hearings Before the Sub-Committee of Ad-
ministrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess., S. Res. 39, at 28, 29, 45-55, 321-325 (1965); PACKARD, THE
NAKED Socmry 37-38 (1964); DASH, THE EAVESDROPPERS 350, 353, 357-358
(1959).
NOTES1966]
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The fourth amendment prohibition of unreasonable searches
and seizures has been the traditional constitutional protection
against unreasonable invasions of privacy.41 The Supreme Court
has heretofore utilized the fourth amendment to determine the
constitutionality of electronic eavesdropping, finding that elec-
tronic eavesdropping resulting in "the reality of an unauthorized
actual intrusion" is in violation of the fourth amendment.
4 2 It
seems obvious that such a physical trespass concept is entirely
inadequate to protect against invasions of privacy which do not
necessarily involve any physical intrusion, as may be accom-
plished by electronic eavesdropping.43 Although the fourth
amendment trespass concept has provided effective protection
against unreasonable physical invasions of privacy,44 it does not
afford protection against electronic invasions of privacy; so
the Court must look to other standards if there is to be any effec-
tive constitutional protection against electronic eavesdropping.
An attempt to reconcile the decisions of the United States Su-
preme Court dealing with electronic eavesdropping underlines
the need to replace the trespass concept. In Go/dman v. United
States46 police officers entered the suspect's office without a
search warrant to plant an electronic listening device. When
the device malfunctioned a detectaphone was held against the
wall of the adjoining office so that the police could overhear all
of the conversations taking place within the suspect's office.
The Court concluded that the officers had not committed a tres-
pass in gathering the evidence and upheld its admissibility, al-
though the use of the detectaphone substituted for the trespass
committed by the police in their abortive attempt to "bug" the
office.
4 6
On the other hand, in Silvemvnan v. United States,47 law offi-
cers inserted a "spiked mike" into a common wall, transforming
the heating system of the accused's home into a gigantic micro-
41. Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965); Frank v. Maryland, 359
U.S. 360, 362-366 (1959); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1885);
United States v. Baxter, 89 F. Supp. 732 (1950).
42. Clinton v. Virginia 377 U.S. 158 (1964) ; Silverman v. United States, 365
U.S. 505, 512 (1961).
43. See Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512-513 (1961) (concur-
ring opinion).
44. Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 480 (1965).
45. 316 U.S. 129 (1942). Accord, Katz v. United States, 369 F.2d 130
(9th Cir. 1966).
46. Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 135 (1942).
47. 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
[Vol. 18
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phone. In excluding the overheard incriminating conversations,
the Court termed the use of the spiked listening device an "un-
authorized physical penetration into the premises" which con-
stituted an unreasonable search and seizure. In reaching this
result, the Court accorded conversations the same constitutional
protections as tangible property.
48
A more recent Supreme Court case, Clinton v. Virginia, cited
Silverman and held that a device which made the impression of
a thumbtack in the wall of an adjoining office constituted a
trespass. 49 The invasion of privacy in Clinton was the same as in
Goldman, but the Supreme Court allowed the electronic eaves-
dropping in Goldman since there was no unauthorized physical
invasion involved.50
Thus, with the sanctity of the home and office hanging in the
balance, the Supreme Court has determined the constitutionality
of electronic eavesdropping by an entirely inadequate concept.
The Supreme Court has thus far declined to recognize the awe-
some capacity of electronic eavesdropping devices to invade
privacy, declaring their use unconstitutional only when they
incidentally effect a physical trespass.
B. The Privacy Standard
The emerging "right to privacy" will furnish more adequate
standards for determining the constitutionality of electronic
eavesdropping. That there is a constitutional right to privacy
cannot be doubted. The Supreme Court has repeatedly recog-
nized the right to privacy, or the right to be let alone, a concept
which lies at the very core of the fourth and fifth amendments. 51
The most distinguished defenders of the right to privacy, Mr.
Justice Holmes and Mr. Justice Brandeis, joined in expressing
the belief that the right to be let alone served as the very foun-
dation of the Bill of Rights:
(The Founding Fathers) sought to protect Americans in
their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions, and their sen-
sations. They conferred, as against the Government, the right
to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the
right most valued by civilized man. 52
48. Id. at 509.
49. Clinton v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 158 (1964).
50. 316 U.S. 129, 134-135 (1942).
51. Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965).
52. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478-79 (1928) (dissenting
opinion).
19661 NoTms
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In his dissent in On Lee v. United States, 3 Mr. Justice Doug-
las revealed that he had been converted by Mr. Justice Brandeis'
Olmstead dissent, supra, and repented of his adherence to the
majority opinion in Goldman v. United States.54 He recently
reaffirmed his convictions in concurring opinion in Silverman
v. United States,55 recognizing that the measure of injury occa-
sioned by the use of electronic eavesdropping devices should not
be measured by the depth of physical penetration or even by the
remoteness of the device from the place being eavesdropped
upon. Rather, he said, the chief consideration should be whether
the privacy of the home was invaded.
There is some difference of opinion as to which amendment,
or combination of amendments, should serve as the source of the
right to privacy, although there is no doubt that privacy is con-
stitutionally protected. Justice Brandeis in his Olmstead dissent
found a union of the fourth and fifth amendments to be the
basis of a comprehensive right to privacy. 56
In Giswold v. ConneeticutT several theories were advanced
as to the source of the right to privacy. Mr. Justice Douglas,
writing for the Court, found the right to privacy protected by
the "penumbra" of the first, third, fourth, fifth, and ninth
amendments, as applied to the states through the fourteenth
amendment."8 Mr. Justice White and Mr. Justice iHarlan con-
curred separately, finding the right to privacy guaranteed by
the "due process of law" clause of the fourteenth amendment.59
Mr. Justice Harlan did not rely on any specific provision of the
Bill of Rights, but instead on the "concept of ordered liberty,"
a standard which permits an occasional look beyond the first
eight amendments to find those fundamental rights included
within the fourteenth amendment.60 Mr. Justice Goldberg joined
in the opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas and also wrote a separate
concurrence, emphasizing the importance of the ninth amend-
ment as evidence that the express provisions of the first eight
53. 343 U.S. 747, 762 (1952) (dissenting opinion).
54. 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
55. 365 U.S. 505, 512-513 (1961) (concurring opinion).
56. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (dissenting opinion).
57. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) [noted in 79 H~av. L. Rlv. 162 (1965)].
53. Id. at 479-507.
59. Id. at 499-507.
60. Id. at 499-502.
[Vol. 18
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amendments do not exhaust the restrictions placed on the states
through the fourteenth amendment. 61
In summary, five Justices in the Griswold case relied on the
ninth amendment, including the adherents of the "ordered
liberty" and "penumbra" views, as a constitutional basis for the
right to privacy. Thus, the G riswold case leaves no doubt that
the Supreme Court recognizes the right to privacy to be a funda-
mental constitutional right.
A clear violation of the right to privacy occurs when electronic
eavesdropping devices are used to overhear and record conver-
sations within a constitutionally protected area. In Grkswold
the constitutionally protected bedroom was afforded protection
from police invasion. An office should be afforded similar pro-
tection from invasion. 2 Since Griswold was concerned with pro-
tecting the privacy of a constitutionally protected area, its result
should not be affected by the means employed to accomplish the
invasion. In fact, the use of electronic eavesdropping equipment
to effect an invasion of the home or office is more reprehensible
than the traditional physical invasion.
In determining whether the police use of electronic eaves-
dropping equipment violates the right to privacy, the Supreme
Court should consider the inherently offensive characteristics of
electronic eavesdropping. Police use of such devices must neces-
sarily be shrouded in secrecy; the suspect is without notice of the
invasion of his privacy. The indiscriminate nature of the elec-
tronic eavesdropping device adds to its offensiveness; it listens
to all conversations within the "bugged" premises regardless of
the speaker or subject matter. Further, electronic investigations
are usually of long-term duration, an important factor in view
of the secrecy which must be maintained throughout the eaves-
dropping operation.
It is by combining an invasion of a constitutionally protected
area with the use of inherently offensive electronic eavesdropping
equipment that results in an unreasonable invasion of privacy.
The Supreme Court recently ordered a new trial for an ap-
pellant so that he might protect himself against any unconstitu-
tionally obtained evidence. 63 This action was taken when it was
discovered that electronic eavesdropping had been utilized in
61. Id. at 456-499.
62. Lanz v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 143 (1962); Silverthorne Lumber Co.
v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1919).
63. Black v. United States, 87 Sup. Ct. 190 (1966).
1966]
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the investigation preceding the appellant's conviction. The action
of the Court indicates a strong distaste for electronic eavesdrop-
ping, especially since none of the evidence obtained by electronic
eavesdropping had been admitted against the appellant.64 Mr.
Justice Harlan, dissenting, stated:
The only basis I can think of for justifying this decision
is that any governmental activity of the kind here in ques-
tion [electronic eavesdropping] automatically vitiates so as
at least to require a new trial any conviction occurring dur-
ing the span of such activity.65
In summary, the use of electronic eavesdropping equipment by
police to overhear and record conversations within constitution-
ally protected areas is an unreasonable invasion of privacy.
Therefore, evidence obtained by such unconstitutional means
should be inadmissible as a denial of due process.
66
IV. CoNcLUsION
Electronic eavesdropping, even where authorized by court
order, seems inherently unconstitutional. Unfortunately, the few
Supreme Court cases which have squarely met the issue of elec-
tronic eavesdropping determined its constitutionality on the basis
of a totally inadequate concept-whether a trespass was accom-
plished in the "bugging" process. Although a court order con-
strued as a valid warrant might authorize a physical entry, any
subsequent electronic eavesdropping would be in violation of
the first, fourth, and fifth amendments. More serious, however,
is the invasion of the right to privacy which results whenever
electronic eavesdropping equipment is used to invade a constitu-
tionally protected area.
If electronic eavesdropping is to be allowed at all, it must be
determined whether the individual's interest outweighs the inter-
est of society to be free from such unconstitutional police prac-
tices. In balancing these interests it seems that any increased
police efficiency which might result from the use of electronic
eavesdropping equipment to secretly invade traditionally private
places is far outweighed by the constitutional violations involved
in such police practice.
RuDoLPH C. BiuNEs, Jn.
64. Id. at 192.
65. Id. at 193 (dissenting opinion).
66. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651 (1961).
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